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l Introduction 
Since the mid-1960s, and particularly since the publication of Fanants 
Wretched of the Earth, sociologists and political scientists with an interest in the 
Third World have been debating the revolutionary potential of those heterogeneous 
groups that are marginal to society and which are collectively termed the 
"lumpenpmletariat". (1) In an adjacent discipline, but with a predominantly 
different geographical focus, scholars like Cobb, Stedmm Jones, Rud6 and Hobsbawm 
have skilfully been exploring marginality in European history. (2) Despite the fact 
that many of these scholars share a common intellectual tradition and interest, there 
has been little cross-fertilization between these distinct fields of research. This 
is hardly surprising since Third World social structures and European historical case 
studies cannot be expected to articulate particularly well. What is and what was 
required are Third World case studies. (3) 
Within the context of this broadly defined problem, the social historian of 
South Africa seems to have a special responsibility, and the opportunity for 
particularly stimulating research. South Africa was the first country in Africa - and 
the only one with 19th century roots - to undergo a fully fledged industrial revolution. 
Within 75 ye- of the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, capital 
transformed the face of the sub-continent and mnerated successive social formations 
which left an increasingly well entrenched white ruling class. Those same transforming 
processes prised black South Africans off their land, separated them from their 
I familiey, reduced them to workers, and then ruthlessly reallocated them to the towns. 
I There, on the bureaucratic leash of the pass laws, they were soon exposed to two 
sociologically similar institutions which served the rapidly industrializing economic 
i system particularly well - the prisons and the mine compounds. (4) In a matter of decades, and sometimes perhaps within the space of even a single generation, Africans 
could successively be pastoralists, peasants, proletarians or prisoners. No blacks 
could have found this downward socio-economic spiral comfortable, and in those cases 
where the time-span was telescoped, the experience must have been singularly traumatic. 
If ever there was scope for the study of "marginality", then surely it is here? 
This essay, then, will generally be concerned with those marginalized black 
groups who, at the turn of the century, made their way to the heart of industrialized 
South Africa - the Witwatersrand. More specifically, it will focus on an association 
of men who, at different times between 1890 and 1920, called themselves "The Regiment 
of the Hills" (~mkosi wa Ntaba), "The Regiment of Gaolbirds" (~mkosi wa ~eneneem), 
"The People of the Stone", Nongoloza, or "Ninevites". Thro* this study it is 
hoped to gain greater insight into the emergence of the black lumpenproletariat, 
understand one of its more identifiable formations, assess its potentialities and 
limitations, and to speculate on a form of African resistance hitherto unexplored in 
South African historiography. 
The Refriment of the Hills, 1890-1899 
In 1867, a Zulu woman named Nompopo presented her husband with a new son. 
The boy, one of six children born to the couple, evidently caused something of a stir 
on his arrival since his parents christened him Mzoozepi - meaning "Where did you 
find him?". Shortly after this event, the father, Niumisimani, must have felt that his 
grazing lands had become inadequate since he moved his wife and children on to land 
owned by a M r  Tom Porter, "near to where the River T'ugela takes its course from the 
Drakensberg". Numisimani, however, continued to spend most of his time at a kraal 
near "Msumkulu" (Mzimkulu?) where he was an induna whilst his dispersed family worked 
on the Porter farm in return for the use of land. 
In 1883, the 16 year old Mzoozepi undertook his first six-month spell as a 
migra;nt labourer when he entered employment as a "garden boy" with a Mr Tom J. of 
Harrismith. During the following three years he again undertook a spell of labour in 
Harris&th, this time acquiring new skills as a groom in the employ of a certain 
"Mr N.". It was thus in about 1886, when he was 19 years old, that Mzoozepi once more 
entered service with M r  Tom J. as a groom. It was also at this juncture that events 
occurred which helped to shape the future course of Mzoozepi~s life, and the story is 
best told in his own words: 
Before I had finished the first month of this employment 
one of the horses got lost. On informing my master of 
this he accused me of being negligent and blamed me for 
it and told me to go and look for it. I told him that 
as I was working in the e d e n  on that day he could not 
hold me responsible for the loss, as all the horses were 
out grazing alone. He then threatened to place me in 
gaol if I did not go out and look for the horse that was 
missing, so I searched but did not find it. He then told 
me to go back to q y  kraal and work for M r  Tom P. again, 
and added that Tom Porter would then bring to him the 
value of the horse that was lost. This amount would 
represent my wages for about two years.... On returnin6 
I asked brother whether it was the law, and whether he 
t h o w t  it fair that I should work and have ny wages kept 
back to pay for the horse which I did not lose. He told 
me that I must work or they would put me in gaol and added 
that he did not want to see me there. I told him that I 
could not work for what I did not lose . . . (5) 
Unippressed with has brother's conservative advice and aggrieved by what he felt to be 
an obvious injustice (6), Mzoozepi decided to escape from his~~employersl\ m e n  Tom 
Porter sent him and another black servant to Johannesburg with transport goods later 
in that year, he took the opportunity to desert and to give himself a new m e  - Jan 
Note. 
The transformation of Mzoozepi to Jan Note was neither instant nor 
painless. For twelve months Mzoozepi was employed as a "houseboy" in the Johannesburg 
suburb of Jeppe, and throu&out this period he continued to fulfil his familial 
obligations by sending cash remittances to his mother via migrant friends who were 
making the journey back to Natal. The problem of Tom J.'s missing horse, however, 
pursued him relentlessly, and more especially when his elder brother cane to work in 
the same city in about in about 1887. In yet another attempt to rid himself of his 
persecutors, Mzoozepi handed his brother £3 which was to be paid to Tom J. in final 
settlement of the latter's loss. This the brother willingly accepted, but he also 
insisted that Mzoosepi accompany him home so that he could be present when the money 
was handed over. This Mzoosepi refused to do. Cynical about the Europeans' sense of 
justice and fearful of his brother and Tom J.ts wrath, Mzoozepi decided to make use 
of the anonymity of the city once more and to move to a new suburb and employment. (7) 
1 
The young Note, of course, was not the only one to perceive Johaxmesburg as 
a city of freedom and opportunity in the late 1880s. Black and white immigrants from 
thro~out Southern Africa and. Europe had come to the Witwatersrand in their thousands 
in the belief that, if they could not make their fortunes, then they would at least 
gain steady employment in the mushrooming town. For many, the more modest objective ~ 
was easily achieved. For others, however, the problem was that the early mining l 
economy and Johannesburg not only boomed - periodically it slumped. As one of the 
local newspapers editorialized in 1895: "In South Africa it is invariably a case of 
feast or famine, of boom or bankruptcy. The happy medium is seldom hit." (8) The 
effect of this relentless influx of cheaper immigrant labour, when compounded by 
marked economic slumps, was constantly to "marginalise" the most vulnerable lower 
echelons of the working class. ( 9 )  Yesterdaycs immigrant and today's worker were 
tomorrowls unemployed. It was at least partly for these reasons that redundant miners, 
unemployed clerks, failed businessmen, ex-colonial troopers, and a large number of 
deserters from the British amed services (10) transformed themselves into pinrps, 
card-sharps, canteen pianists, bottle collectors, billiard markers, fences, skittle 
alley attendants, petty thieves, burglars, safe robbers, illicit liquor sellers or 
hi&way robbers. (11) When Jan Note moved from Jeppe to Turffontein and "got a job 
as a kitchen boy and groom to four single men who were living in a house at the foot 
of a hill near a small railway station" (12), he unconscious~y entered the milieu of 
the lumpenproletariat, and a suburb known to be the haunt of white criminals. (13) 
l 
Sson and McDonald, two of the employers at Turffontein, gave their new 
black servapt explicit instructions and in return offered to remunerate him comparatively 
generously. He was not to allow any of his black friends near the house, he was to 
attend to the horses most carefully and, just in case the groom failed to understand 
the message, they showed him a revolver and threatened to shoot him should he disobey. 
Jan Note did not disobey, but he did note that his new employers kept rather strange 
hours : 
, 
After breakfast the four men would go out at about 8 or 
l 
l 
' 9 a.m. on their horses and would return at midday for 
dinner and remain at home until it was dusk. They would 
l then go out again and not return until about midnight. 
: :They always seemed to bring back some money with them and I used to see them counting it at night. (14) 
l 
It presumably took the young man very little time to realize that he was in fact being 
employed by a gang of Eurapeaq criminals but, at a wage of £6 per month, he would have 
been equally quick to appreciate the virtue of silence. (15) 
It was probably during 1888, after a few months of "loyal" service, that 
mson first invited Note to join the gang on one of their expeditions. Still cast in 
the role of the black servant, Note joined the gang on successive expeditions during 
the following months and served a criminal apprenticeship by observation. At first 
hand he saw how Tyson and his men held up passanger coaches and robbed the white 
travellers, or how they ambmhed the company carts that conveyed the workers' wages 
to the more isolated gold mines. (16) He also learned how the less ambitious 
"abathelisa" (tax collector) trick could extract relatively small but constant sums 
of cash from black workers. In this latter variation Tyson's gang simply did what 
countless other official state robbers (border guards, police, customs officials and 
railway conductors) did to migrant workers throughout southern Africa. They would 
approach a party of African travellers pretending to be policemen, demand to see some 
or other form of documentation such as a pass or vaccination certificate, handcuff the 
blacks while the "inspectionll was carried out, and them remove any cash found on the 
workers prior to releasing them. (17) 
Whilst learning these basics of the criminal craft Note was presumably willing 
to tolerate his role as "servant". Crime and the colour bar, however, were not readily 
compatible. Given the size of the gang's takings and his modest wage, his well 
developed sense of justice and his independent spirit, it did not take long for Note 
to become discontented with his lot as white man's "boy". In the knowledge that there 
were greater earnings to be made if he operated with criminals of his own colour, he 
decided to break away from Tyson's gmg and to seek out the Witwatersrand's black 
lumpenproletariat. 
Working his way along the ethnic crevices of black society with which he was 
most familiar, Note soon discovered that most Zulu gebengu (criminals/robbers) did 
not live within Johannesburg at all. Hounded and harassed by police and the pass laws 
in the city, many of the ~ e b e w  had taken refuge in the Klipriversberg hills 
immediately to the south of Johannesburg. (18) There, living in the kloofs and caves 
of a place they called Shabalawawa, some 200 men, women, and children had placed 
themselves under the leadershi'p of a man who hailed from Qwabe in Zululand, and who 
called himself Nohlopa. (19) In this loosely organized community of izigeleke~ 
(brigands) it did not take long for a man of Note's talent to bring himself to the 
notice of Nohlopa, and within a very short space of time he had attained the position 
of induna (headman) - in effect second-in-command. 
It was probably at some time during 1889 that the community at Shabalawawa 
fiqt started to experience a series of occasional and ideological tremors. First, 
the @be= were startled to learn that their leader,Nohlopa, had been arrested for 
breaking into a tailor's shop in Kerk Street, Johannesburg. A second surprise, however, 
also lay in store for them. While in prison serving his sentence, Nohlopa learned to 
read and write, and spent a considerable amount of his time studying the Bible. On his 
release he returned to the community and, after discussions with Note, announced to the 
pbengu that he no longer wished to be associated with the gang and that he intended 
to spend his time preaching to his black brothers on the Rand. This decision left the 
izimlekege under Note's leadership for the first time. 
Shortly after these events Jan Note started to do a little reading of his 
own. Using that same splendidly ambiguous text that had so influenced Nohlopa - the 
Bible - he derived inspiration which dmve him in a radically different direction. (20) 
It was the Old Testament book of Nahwn which particularly impressed Note, and in it he 
read "about the great state Nineveh which rebelled against the Lord and I selected that 
name for m y  gang as rebels against the Governmentfs lawf1. (21) To this generalized 
ideological vision Note added vital paremilitary conceptions, sending the really 
powerful shock waves through Shabalawawa which transformed it from a loosely organized 
community of sbengu into Umkosi wa Ntaba - The Regiment of the Hills. As Note 
himself put it later: 
The system I introduced was as follows: I qyself was the 
Inkoos [sic] Nkulu or king. Then I had an Induna Mnilu 
styled lord and corresponding to the Governor-General. 
Then I had another lord who was looked upon as father 
of us all and styled Nonsala. Then I had my government 
who were knowh by numbers, number one to four. I also 
had my fighting general on the model of the boer vecht 
generaal. The administration of justice was confined 
to a judge for serious cases and a landdrost for petty 
cases. The medical side was entrusted to a chief doctor 
or Inyanga. Further I had colonels, captains, sergeant- 
majors and sergeants in charge of the rank and file, the 
Amoso ja or Shosi (soldiers). (22) 
"This reorganisation", the "king" pertinently pointed out, "took place in the hills of 
Johannesburg several years before the 1899 war was dreamed of." 
Just how extensive, active, or successful the reorganized izigelekege were 
is extremely difficult to assess. What is generally known is that the decade leading 
up to the South African War was a particularly successful one for highww robbers. (23) 
This is more especially true of the early 1890s, prior to the arrival of the railways 
in Johannesburg, when there were large African labour flows which g e b e w  could 
capitalize on. In 1890, for example, it was estimated that about 3,000 black workers 
made their w a y  on foot to the Witwatersrand each month (24), and in 1892 the m i n i n g  
magnate Herrman Eckstein estimated that there were about 1,000 Africans on the move 
between Johannesburg and Kimberley at any one time. (25) Migrant labour on this scale, 
much of it funnelling southwards from the gold mines, much have made the Klipriviersberg 
a particularly happy hunting ground for highway robbers. (26) It is most unlikely that 
the Regiment of the Hills did not claim its share of the workers1 wages that passed 
through the countryside. Within the city itself there are also some tell-tale sips 
which point roughly in the direction of the Regiment. Early in 1890, for example, the 
Standard and Diggersts News complained about the activities of a well organized gang 
of "Zulu" burglars in the town. (27) Court cases arising from the abathelisa trick - 
especially those involving "policemen" with their own"ra;nks" - are even more 
suggestive. (28) More cone-te still is Jan Note's own testimony that the gang 
penetrated the prisons of the South African Republic where it gained recruits and 
taught new prisoners the organizational structure of the Regiment. (29) 
Most of this evidence, however, is scattered, fragmentary and circumstantial. 
On balance we are perhaps best advised to see the years 1890-1899 as simply 
constituting the formative period of the Ninevite organization. The Regiment of the 
Hills developed in one of those "types of hwlshn society which lie between the 
evolutionary phase of tribal and kinship organization, and modern capitalist and 
industrial society". (30) If Note was in any way "typical", then it is possible that 
the ranks of the pbengu were largely filled with migrants and landless Labourers. (31) 
Its origins lay in the countryside, and the early community of men, women and children 
at Shabalawawa operated within a largely rural milieu - on the very margins of the 
Witwatersrand where a state with limited coercive capacity could not continually harass 
its members. Like the Mafia, then, it was "essentially a rural phenomenon to begin 
with". (32) But, to the extent that it was reorganized by Note, and operated within 
the city and prisons, the organization was already being transformed before the War.(33) 
In order to appreciate the subsequent transformation of the Ninevites into an 
essentially urban organization we now need to consider the influence of other events 
and processes. First, the impact of the South African War (1899-1902) and the social 
upheaval which it occasioned, should be explored. Secondly, the evolution of the 
organization should be seen within the context of an economic system that was 
urbanizing and,industrializing even more rapidly than before 1899. Thirdly, we should 
be alert to increased coercive capacity of the state and mining capitalist after the 
War. 5-1 particular, we should note the extent to which the sociological parameters 
of the Ninevite organization were shaped by those exclusively male institutions - the 
prisons and the mine compounds. 
"People of the Stone and the Nowloza": 1899-1906 
One of the initial effects of the war was to disperse a large part of the 
labouring population of the Witwatersrand. In the earliest months of the conflict 
thousands of migrant workers poured into Johannesburg seeking travelling passes and 
some means of organized transport to their rural homes. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the general air of tension and anxiety also permeated into the ranks of the 
izimlekege in the Klipriviersberg. Notels men led a particular form of parasitic 
existence which relied on the regular robbery of small bands of migrant workers 
making their way through the countryside. The long term viability of this mode of 
operation, however, was threatened by rapid large scale movements and by a war which 
would probably terminate the flow of migrant labour altogether. For these, and other 
reasons, it is likely that the inhabitants of Shabalawawa joined the black throng 
making its way to the city. 
This sudden influx of impoverished black workers, together with the 
presence of professional criminals at a time when the resources of the state were 
even more strained than usual, helped in the proliferation of crime. The government 
thus had at least a partial interest in ensuring that the "surplus" black population 
was evacuated to its m a l  hinterland as soon as possible. On a single day in 
October over 3,000 workers departed by rail for Mozambique whilst hundreds of others 
walked to the borders of the republic. "The office of J. S. Marwick, the Natal 
Native Agent in Johannesburg, was surrounded by thousands of African workers, aware 
that no w m e n t s  had been made for their return home, and anxious lest their 
earnings be confiscated before they left the Republic. " (34) The predominantly Zulu 
crowd that congregated outside Marwick(s office would have constituted the most natural 
meeting place for Note's izialekem and, when the Agent got permission to march these 
migrants to the Transvaal-Natal border, it is likely that several gebenm inserted 
themselves into the refugee column. After the war, the Natal African newspaper 
Ipepa 10 Hlanga claimed that Marwickts party contained "many perlsons of disrepute1I, 
including "a self-organized gang of native desperadoes": ( 3 5 )  It would seem, 
therefore, that at least some of the criminal elements on the Witwatersrand complex 
were spread to other parts of southern Africa during the early months of the war. 
But if the early part of the war saw the dispersal of Africans, then there 
was also more than ample opportunity for blacks to regroup as the subsequent 6onflict 
unfolded. Perhaps inevitably, much of this regrouping was involuntary and the war 
threw together, on a fairly undiscriminating basis, existing lumpenproletarian 
elements and those undergoing crisis-induced marginalisation. Several thousand rural 
people found themselves herded into the concentration camps set up by the invading 
British administration. Many of those in need of a living, not excluding petty 
criminals, were employed in a variety of occupations by the British v. Indeed, it 
is significant that many of those who subsequently joined the ranks of the Ninevites 
gained their first experience of crime and the urban areas while serving with the 
British troops. ( 3 6 )  Those who found their way to prison stood the risk of being 
conscripted for service with military units in Natal. But as far as the Witwatersrand 
itself was concerned perhaps the most significant meeting place of all developed at 
the Ferreira Deep Mine compound. There, the army established a reception centre for 
l~vagcantsn who were compelled to earn the five shillings necessary for a pass by 
S tone-breaking1' . 
Their nature and function ensured that the concentration camps, prisons and 
compounds exercised a high degree of control over the black inmates. But this degree 
of coercion over the African population was not solely or simply a war-time exigency; 
in many instances these institutions represented the vanguard of those oppressive 
instruments that continued to function under the post-war administration. As one 
student of the war has noted: 
The Milner regime extended the pass department, created 
a system of courts to deal with breaches of masters and 
servants legislation, introduced a scheme to register 
the finger-prints of all mining employees to help 
identify workers who deserted, and established 
regulations to prohibit mining companies recruiting 
workers in labour districts. The possibility of 
African workers exchanging employers to find the most 
congenial working conditions was therefore considerably 
reduced . . . (37) 
In 1903 the mining companies contributed to this coercion when they tightened up the 
functioning of their compounds and, in 1905, the state further embellished the system 
when it opened the Cinderella Prison on the East Rand, which supplied local mines with 
prison labour. (38) 
This web of legislation and its supporting institutions of compounds, courts 
and prisons did not only reduce the mobility of black labourers - it also had other 
less intentional consequences. The constant infractions of the pass laws in a state 
with increased law-enforcement capacity produced a very distinctive labouring 
population: one characterized by its high degree of nominal 'f'briminalfl experience. 
Ceaseless prosecutions not only produced a working class with considerable experience 
of two sociologically similar institutions (the prison and the compound), it also 
forced the labourers and the lumpenproletarians to rub shoulders to a greater extent 
than they might otherwise have done. The pass laws and a more efficient police system 
produced a drag-net which drew& Africans, law-abiding and law-evading alike, into 
the Witwatersrand complex and kept them there. Seen from this perspective, it was 
perhaps predictable that when Note's organization re-emerged after the war it would 
be more urban based than previously, and that its natural home would be the prison/ 
compound complex. 
Purely as an informed guess, we can speculate that the post-war Ninevite 
movement first re-emerged amongst those "vagrant" stonebreakers at the Ferkeira Deep 
Mine compound. What we do know with greater certainty, however, is that the 
characteristic Ninevite form of organization was detectable in the prisons soon after 
the war. In 1904, J. S. Marwick, by then Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs in the 
Transvaal, knew that the society was operating in the prisons under the name of "The 
People of the Stonef1. (39) From at least the same date - but particularly during 
years when there were more marked recessions in the mining industry, such as 1906 and 
1908 - flloafersll, "vagrantsff, petty criminals, the unemployed and pass-less were also 
joining the society under another name, Nonmloza. But, whereas the llPeople of the 
Stonef1 met in prison, those who joined Nongoloza (ll~ongolozaff lias Jan Note) did so 
in prospect holes, disused mine shafts, abandoned or isolated buildings, and in old 
quarries. (40) BJr 1906, the Ninevite organization was already operating with two 
loosely knit associations - one based within and the other outside the prisons. 
The "People of the Stonef1 and the llNongolozalf might have been nominally 
different, but they shared overriding similarities which betrayed their common origin. 
Both associations explicitly organized themselves on the basis of the model pioneered 
by Jan Note and, in the loosest sense possible, both pledged their allegiance to 
flNongolozall himself. But there was also another similarity developing towards the end 
of this period which betrayed the common sociological parent- of an all-male 
institution. A high incidence of sodomistic sexual relationships amongst both groups 
manifested itself all the more clearly as the indentured Chinese labourers left the 
mine compounds of the Witwatersrand and had their places taken by a growing number of 
African migrant workers. (41) By 1906, when under missionary pressure the Chamber of 
Mines conducted an enquiry into "unnatural native vicef1, it was: 
... a common legend throug;hout the mines that a Shangdan 
named 1 Sokisi [poseibly George Schoko , a noted Ninevite 
leader] had, while in prison [~inderella?] , practised 
unnatural vice, and that he had introduced the custom 
of keeping 8 izinkotshane 1 [hoy-wives] at the Brakpan 
Mines, from whence it spread until at the present day 
there is no doubt it is commonly practised throughout 
all the Mines on the Witwatersrand. (42) 
Prima facie it seems probable that the prison/compound complex developed by the state 
and mining industry after the war was also most successful in excluding women from 
urban African life. 
This much having been noted, however, it still remained a fact that the 
Ninevite organization existed as two largely separate sub-associations between 1899 
and 1906. There is little or no evidence of a common leadership, and few indications 
that the "People of the Stoneff and Nongoloza co-operated extensively in their matters 
of criminal business. The Ninevites, perhaps still dominated by the classic lumpen- 
proletarian elements of a post-war situation, still lacked overall organization, vision, 
unity, discipline and professional leadership. For these latter attributes the 
movement had to wait for the reappearance of one man: one man who was "held in 
superstitious veneration by the rank and filef1 (43); one man whom criminals greeted 
in a hushed voice with the salute that was usually reserved for Zulu royalty, 
flBayetelf (44); one man who could proudly claim the title "Nongo1ozaf1. Such a man 
existed. He was a Ifshort thick-set Zuluff, about 30 years of age, and apparently "with 
no appearance to command respectt1. (45) His name was Jan Note. 
The Ninevites in the Ascendent: 1906-1912 
At present we, unfortunately, know nothing about Jan Note's life or movements 
between 1899 and the half-decade immediately following the war. Perhaps along with 
otherpbenjqu, he frequented Natal-Zululand, or maybe he became part of the amalaita 
bands that featured prominently in Durban during this period. (46) There is also the 
outside possibility that he entered employment with a white farmer in the Orange Free 
State, and that whilst there he fell foul of the authorities in a dispute involving 
wages and the pass law. (48) Be this as it may, 1908 found Nongoloza in the Volksmst 
prison on the Natal-Transvaal border. 
In the same year, in the company of two other convicts, Nongoloza bmke out 
of the Volksmst prison and immediately broke into the court-house, where he removed 
a revolver and 75 cartridges. From there Note and his companions moved north-aast to 
the small town of WaJskerstroom. Here Note, for some reason or other, attracted the 
attention of a white police sergeant. When the policeman and another white attempted 
to arrest the escaped convicts, Note promptly opened fire on them and fled. After 
this escapade Nongoloza and his small party headed northwards along the sparsely 
populated Swaziland border, apparently causing considerable consternation amongst the 
rural white inhabitants of the area. Somewhere along this route Nongoloza shed one of 
his followers, and eventually he and a single companion entered the Easteqm Transvaal 
gold mining town of Barberton. 
Nongolozals arrival at Barberton coincided with substantial European 
preparations for a civil reception to be held in a local hotel. At night he and his 
companion let themselves into the hotel dining room, where they proceeded to make 
merry on the food and drink supposedly set aside for the white South African 
dignitaries. On leaving the premises the two blacks were spotted by an African 
policeman who chose to pursue the escaping convicts - an unwise decision, since Note 
promptly shot him through the leg. The noise of the shooting, however, attracted more 
policemen, and this time a slightly inebriated Nongoloza and his accomplice were 
captured. (49) Soon afterwards Note appeared in court charged with escape from lawful 
custody a;nd several counts of attempted murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
From Barberton the state transported Nongoloza to Pretoria, where it not only placed 
him in the local prison but also deposited him well within operating distance of the 
Witwatersrand" urban prison-compound complex. 
Note's reputation and qualities of leadership at once assured him of the 
overall command of the Ninevites within the Pretoria prison, where he was ruthlessly 
supported and assisted by loyal notables such as Meshine ("~overnment~l), Jinoyi 
(ft~i&ting ~eneral"), Charlie (YDoctor") and Jim Dunde (lf~udge"). (50) Between 1908 
and 1912, however, Nongoloza also set about consolidating his hold over a criminal 
empire which extended over some 400 s q w e  miles of the Witwatersrand, stretching 
from Krugersdorp in the west to Nigel in the east, and from Johannesburg in the north 
to Kliprivier in the south. In order to achieve this, he united under his leadership 
criminal gangs entrenched in regional strongholds throughout this portion of the 
Transvaal, and by so doing reaffirmed his undisputed right to the title lfNkosi NkuLu". 
To the west of Johannesburg, Note succeeded in gaining the allegiance of 
"Chief" George Schoko (alias Kleintje) and his followers. This gang, which was 
centred on the prospect holes in the Canada Junction area, specialized in abathelisa 
robberies of workers making their way to and from the West Rand. Not far from this, 
to the south-east, Nongoloza was followed by another important leader, "Chief" Xam 
Nyambezi (alias ~ose~h). Nyambesi and his followers at one stage lived in the Crown 
Deep Mine compound and from this base they raided and plundered the African locations 
of south-western Johannesburg. East of Johannesburg, Notes most trusted follower was 
perhaps Jan Mtembu, who, by 1912, had made his way to the Premier Mine near Pretoria. 
In the Cinderella Prison at Boksburg - a vital centre in the Ninevite orgaaization - 
the gang was under the control of Jim Mandende. kndende, a Xhosa who had won his 
criminal spurs back in the da;ys of the South African Republic, was personally appointed 
by the lTlkosi W u W .  In the far south-east of the Witwatersrand, Nongoloza was 
represented by llChiefff Jacob Xaba. Xaba and his followers invariably inhabited the 
open countryside between the mine compounds of Brakpan and Nigel, and from this base 
they lived by robbery and stock theft. By 1912, the charismatic Note had not only 
succeeded in uniting these five important "chiefs" under his command; he could also 
rely on the support of at least ten other 'lgenerals" based in mine compounds all along 
the line of reef. (51) At the height of his power and influence Nongoloza could count 
on the committed support of between 750 and 1,000 Ninevites - the large majority of 
them being Zulu, but also including Shaslgdan, Basuto, Xhosa and Swazi. (52) 
That Note possessed charisma seems beyond doubt. But leadership and empires 
are not built on charisma alone, they also have more mundane and mechanical 
requirements - such as the need for communication. Nongoloza made sure that his 
wishes reached the Ninevites through an elaborate system of messages which could reach 
into most corners of the Witwatersrand. The constant ebb and flow of pass offenders in 
the prisons was perhaps the most central feature in this information network. New 
arrivals would pass on information of the gang's activities, while discharged 
prisoners in turn would convey Note's wishes from qrison. Most frequently, discharged 
prisoners would make their way to one or other of the ricksha yards in Johannesburg 
where they would pass on Note's message. These "ricksha boys", whose occupation ideally 
suited them to the task, would in turn pass on the message to the comunications 
officer of the various gangs. For example, Nkuku (alias m ora age") , who held the rank 
of "office boy" in the number two gang at Randfontein, used to collect messages from 
Nongoloza via Mpilempile in a Jeppestown ricksha y d .  (53) Not all messages, however, 
passed through these sorts of contacts, whom the police called "recognised agents who 
disseminate orders =d instructions to the members of the gangs outside". (54) There 
was also "top secret" or floperationslt information passed between gangs which had no need 
to be routed thro* the ricksha yards. Thus we know, for example, that promotions 
within the organization were sometimes discussed in letters that passed between 
lfgeneralslf from different regions. (55) Mere "office boys" or 'Tmessengers" were not 
allowed access to such privileged information, and such messages were usually carried 
only by people oP fshigh rank'?. It therefore seems likely that Nongolozafs 
organization made use of a sophisticated two-tier communication system. 
For Nongoloza and his qqgenerals" to issue orders was one thing; to ensure 
that they were obeyed was another. The Ninevites, no less than any otlner a w  or 
larger organization, had need of a disciplinary code which could help to control 
members who were often t o w  individualists. Here, as in the case of the 
communications system, it was the constant movement of urban Africans into the 
prisons that enabled the army of Nineveh to function. Althougk there were members 
of the organization both inside and outside of the prisons, most of the disciplining 
of fine members took place within the confined space of the communal cells that 
characterized the Transvaal penal system. Here there was no place to hide from 
Ninevite justice. Nongoloza and his officers could rest assured in the knowledge 
that, at some stage or other, an infringement of the pass laws would inevitably bring 
a deviant Ninevite to their prison "court". 
Lesser offences under the Ninevite disciplinary code centred around matters 
of status, privilege and discipline within the ranks. Thus a man who developed a 
fully fledged homosexual relationship with an u m f a  (boy), before having officially 
attained the rank of kehla (status of Zulu male who had been given the chief's 
permission to marry) within the organization, stood to be tried before a 
lfmagistratefl. (56) This, or other relatively minor infringements resulted in the 
withdrawal of privileges such as tobacco, food or sex while in the communal cells. 
Those with rank who contravened the code stood to be demoted - a sentence which also 
involved the sacrifice of certain benefits while in prison. (57) 
More serious offences, however, were immediately referred to "superior 
courtsf1, where there were judgest1, llprosecutors", "doctors" and If jurymenw present. - 
Charges brought in these courts invariably centred around breaches of Ninevite 
security, and the sentences were harsh and bloody. Informers who passed on relatively 
unimportant infomtion to the police or prison authorities could consider themselves 
lu~ky, since on being sentenced they would simply have their front teeth knocked out. 
More important transgressors were less lucky since they stood the risk of being 
stabbed through the shoulder blades with sharpened nails. If the "court" was of the 
opinion that llnailslf were not a suitable punishment for the offender, then the 
equally unpleasant al.terr@tive of the flballoonll becme a possibility. "Ballooning" 
consisted of tossing the victim to greater and greater heigkts with the aid of a 
blavlket until, at a pre-arranged signal, the bidet would be removed and. the offender 
allowed to plummet into the concrete floor of the cell. (58) 
I 
Yet another form of severe punishment was the dreadea - the 
systematic beating of the ribs with clenched fists. rlTombo&ll Umfaaawendulnr,who was 
in the Pretoria prison at the time of Nongoloza himself, offered a first-hand account 
of this particular Ninevite ritual: 
The penalty inflicted as a rule is anything from 3 to 10 
blows. But before this penalty is inflicted they call 
their Doctor who is also a member of the gang, and he 
feels your pulse and orders the punishment reduced if he 
thinks the person is not very strong. He will reduce it 
from 10 to 5. I have on two occasions been assaulted in 
this manner the first time it was at Pretoria. I had 
already joined their society when I was ordered to be 
tried as I was a native constable in the Transvaal Police 
prior to my arxest. I was taken before the lkgiatrate, a 
prisoner named Toby! , and he punished me for being a 
native constable and sentenced me to be punished by memc 
of the Isigubul. I was to receive 20 blows on each side 
of the ribs with clenched fists. A Doctor m e d  
Charlie, also a hard labour prisoner, was called 
to examine and he ordered the punishment reduced 
to 10 blows only. I was then taken into the 
middle of the room and told to stand straight up 
with my hmds folded, and four members who ranked 
as private soldiers [?were] detailed by the captain. The 
four soldiers get around you, one at the rear and 
front of you, and then Captain then orders them 
to attention. They then clench their fists and 
when he orders "present armsf1 they extend their 
arms in a fi&ting attitude and continue this 
until he gives the order of lsigubul when each of 
the soldiers starts punching you from side to side 
until the Captain gives the order !halt?. This is 
a very severe punishment and often when you cough 
up a person brings up blood through the effects ... (59) 
But even the cowing of blood that came with Itshaya sigubu' was considered 
insufficient punishment for the worst offenders of all. For them only death was 
good enough. 
Unfortunately, we have few specific cases to show what "crimes1' exactly 
warranted the death sentence. The one case that we do know about, that of Matshayli 
Zungu, is perhaps not "typical" of Ninevite executions. Zungu, a Zulu miner from 
the Cason Compound, had the misfortune to cross the path of the local Boksburg branch 
of the Ninevites - a particularly tough gang that numbered amongst its members 
veterans, from Pretoria Local and "Blue Sky Gaol" (~inderella prison). On being asked 
to join the gang and choose himself a kehla,. Zungu made the mistake of refusing. 
This refusal caused the "Government" and the "Generalf1 to confer for a minute or two. 
Thereafter, the "Generallf - Elijah Mazinyo - simply said: "1 sentence you to the 
rope. " Whereupon Zungu was promptly strangled by means of a handkerchief. (60) The 
Ninevites then half-concealed the body by inserting it into a hole in the wall of the 
slimes dam, and the whole affair ended with the subsequent execution of 14 members of 
the gang. (61) 
But both the choice of victim and the crudity of the execution mark the 
Zungu murder as being rather exceptional. "The orders for murder", wrote one of the 
Witwatersrand detectives most faniliar with the Ninevites, "are prhcipally against 
natives who have formerly belonged to the gang and afterwards turned police 
informers." (62) The police believed that at least some of these informers had been 
killed through having large doses of powdered glass administered to them - a refined 
me$hod when compased with "the rope". (63) It was the same detective who described 
what was perhaps the most subtle Ninevite method of all. "In prison", he wrote, "the 
death sentence is carried out in the following manner. The prisoner is strangled 
with a wet towel. The Executioners then chew mealies, and stuff it down his throat. 
I am told that natives so found have been certified cause of death due to choking 
.whilst eating mealies [maize] .l1 (64) 
By 1912 Nongoloza controlled an army which knew what his directives were, 
and one which operated with a disciplinary code that was backed by the ruthless 
exercise of power. However, it is not e n o w  for amies to simply have power; they 
have to be seen to have power and to exercise it. But visibility implies recognition, 
and how were men who considered themselves to be "judges", "generalsf1, "doctorsw and 
lfcaptainslf to be distiwished from the ordinary mass of prisoners and proletarians 
herded into the conformity of a "total institution"? Where did a compound or prison 
nvquber end, and a Ninevite begin? 
In some ways this problem must have been at its most acute within the 
anonymity of the prisons. But even here, or perhaps especially here, a new inmate of 
the communal cells would soon learn who were the Ninevites and who were the 
~Y3cotlandersf' - a rival B, noted for their rejection of sodony. (6.5) The sacrifices 
of food and tobacco which the "troopsf1 made for their "officers" would distinguish the 
former from the latter. So, too, would have the show trials and rituals associated 
with Nongoloaa's men. But by the end of this period there was an even more visible 
sign that was invariably associated with the Ninevites - and especially its 
leadership. This was the large "1.S." sign imprinted on the prison jacket, which 
denoted an "indeterminate sentence". (66) There is no doubt that the "I. S." label on 
the Ninevitets back was also in some wa~r a badge, capable of eliciting its own twisted 
form of "respectft in a twisted institution. 
What was only partly discernible in the prisons became more starkly 
silhouetted within the relatively relaxed confines of the compounds and their 
mediate peri-urban surroundings. Here, the Ninevites could more fully and freely 
exercise the paraphernalia of an amy - jargon, drill, weapons and a uniform. In the 
sub-culture of Nongoloza the troops used their own distinctive phrases and slang: a 
"birdt1 was an ignorant person, a "buckt1 was a victim, the gang was the "stone", and a 
person "who came with the horses" had to be closely watched since he was a spy or a 
policeman. (67) Like many soldiers, they had a reputation for heavy drinking and 
smoking: in this case a predilection for imbibing that potent working class concoction 
called &ali and smoking dagga - marijuana. (68) Up to about mid-1910 the most notable 
part of their uniform was the rather distinctive sort of hat that they wore. This type 
of hat was eventually discarded and, by 1912, the most notable feature in the dress of 
a Ninevite squad was the manner in which the trousers were closely pinned to the ankles 
by means of string or bicycle clips. (70) 
Unlike some of its modern counterparts, however, Jan Notets "armyt1 was not 
all dressed up with nowhere to go and nothing to do. Its central concern was crime, 
and its members knew exactly how to set about that business. The central thrust of 
that criminal activity, however, seems to have shifted slightly between 1908 and 1912 
as a subtle change in the rank-and-file composition of the Ninevite arrny took place. 
Between 1906 and about 1910, the majority of the "soldiers1' or kehla were described 
by the police as coming from the "vagrant class". (71) Based outside the compounds, 
these l1vagrant soldiers" concentrated on the abathelisa trick and different degrees 
of violent robbery. Under the leadership of men like Nyambezi and Schoko, most of 
their crimes were directed against people - invariably fellow Africans. (72) But 
these Ninevite troops were particularly vulnemble to pass offences and exposure to 
the police. Indeed, as one detective noted: "These vagrants have often told me that 
they have no fear of gaol, as it is much better than being outside, where they are 
continually harassed by the police and asked for their passes.'? (73) This was 
undoubtedly an overstatement, but the "vagrault soldiers" soon learnt that they needed 
more defensive cover from the pass laws. So, from 1910-11, many of the Ninevites 
started making use of a neat stratagem, which helped keep the police at bay. They 
took refuge in those large industrial forts which the state had assisted in developing - 
the mine compounds. Compounds were designed to keep people in, but they also 
effectively kept the police out. (74) By 1912, a frustrated Deputy Commissioner of 
Police could note that the continual police harassment of "vagrants'1 for passes had 
I%3,riven them [the ~inevites] into the mine compounds where they enlist as labourers 
and where they can enjoy all the protection that is extended to registered mine 
boys . . .l1. (75) Once pushed into the compounds the Ninevite Masilvers (lfrecruiting 
officersvt) had a field day. Throu&out 1910-11 they recruited migrant workers into 
their lfarmy", and when a drought in 1912 pushed yet more peasants off the land and 
into the mines the Ninevite organization started to develop a firmer industrial base. 
As more "workersf1 than "vagrants" started to join the organization, so its criminal 
focus started to shift. By 1912 much of Nongolozats army was concentrating on store 
and housebreaking - i.e. property rather than people had become its first objective. 
The Ninevite criminal expeditions to acquire property manifested a high 
degree of professional sophistication and evidence of careful planning. At 
Randfontein, no burglary would take place until such time as the "number two gang", 
composed of juniors under the supervision of a lllanddrostll and "lieutenantf1, had 
filed their reconnaissance report. Only thereafter would the older men and senior 
officers who composed "number one gangf1 go out on a job. When they did eventually 
set out to burgle a store or home, they invariably carried the tools of their trade 
with them - screwdrivers, files, crowbars, jumpers, keys and, occasionally, guns. 
The companies! tools might have worked for the mine owners during the day, but at 
night they worked for the llworkersll and the lllumpensll. In an attempt to avoid 
recognition and spread their activities, the Ninevite gangs would, not always work the 
same criminal "patch". To do this they would swop passes with llamyll units based in 
neighbouring territories; thus, for example, Nongolozats followers in Heidelberg 
sometimes would go to llworkll in BoksburpNorth on borrowed passes. 
As a result of these criminal sorties substantial quantities of loot, 
usually in the form of money or clothing, flowed into the mine compounds, and it is 
at this point that we have to consider the question of how these goods were distributed. 
At first glance, the fragmentary evidence at present available seems promising for the 
reader in search of Hobsbawmts "social bandits". For one thing, it is known that 
members of the same Ninevite gang frequently shared clothing - including stolen 
property. (76) It is also known that when a Ninevite gang broke into Schwab's Eating 
House a.nd Mine Store in 1912 they returned to the compound and "All boys in the room 
were awakened and asked to have some meat as they had a bag full of it". (77) On 
.second thoughts, however, this evidence is less than promising. The sharing of 
clothing is a common practice amongst the poor or the working class and there is nothing 
pasticularly significant in this. In any case, the sharing appears to have been 
confined to members of the gang. Also, meat is a commodity that deteriorates 
particularly rapidly, and gang members might simply have sought to minimize the risk 
of informing through sharing the proceeds of this particular robbery. None of this 
therefore can be construed as evidence of a type of "Robin Hood" generosity, and there 
is, in fact, little evidence of a fundamental egalitarian streak running through the 
Ninevite philosophy. If anything, there was a broadly unequal distribution of loot 
even within the hierarchical organization. 
Like all leaders, those in the Ninevites distributed patronage and 
occasional gifts to their followers. The fact that they were called "chiefs" by some 
of their followers is possibly also suggestive of a redistributive function. Close 
examination, however, does not reveal any major redistribution of goods and it would 
appear that the leaders kept back a major part of loot for themselves. Jan Note himself 
claimed to have accumulated "bags of money", but the same could hardly be said for the 
majority of his followers. (78) Such redistribution as did occur within the movement 
arose largely unconsciously and it only marginally improved the lot of the poorest 
Ninevites of all - the umfaans. 
The hundreds of young boys between the ages of 13 and 16 who entered the 
Witwatersrand mine compounds, the umfaans, constituted the poorest paid workers in the 
industry. They were also the subject of close attention of the Ninevite Hasilvers. 
As an observer of the compounds noted in 1909: 
When new squads of bay@ come in the picaninnies are 
watched with anxious eyes, and proposals are made at 
the earliest opportunity, and 'matchest are made, 
and 'trueness' and tfidelityf are demanded, and 
failure brings about a disturbance, and likely a row. (79) 
It was these boys who became the "wives" of the kehlas, or soldiers, in the Ninevite 
organization. As surrogate wives, however, they were kept in very much the same sort 
of role that Ninevites would have expected of more orthodox wives. The boys could 
clean, sew or cook, but were not allowed to play any directly important economic role 
in the organization m d  its operations. Thus no would be involved in actual 
criminal activities. (80) m t ,  in return for their domestic services, the umfaans 
would receive gifts and money from their Ninevite husbands. Almost invariably the boy- 
wives would also be given the kehla's portion of the loot for safe keeping. (81) To 
the limited extent that the poorly paid umfaans in the compound benefited from such 
gifts and presents, there was a marginal redistribution of goods within the Ninevite 
organization. 
This pattern of loot distribution, however, in no way dampened Ninevite 
enthusiasm for the organization, or undermined the members' loyalty to Nongoloza. 
By mid-1912, when the Ninevite army was perhaps at its most developed, the movement 
was said to be gaining "further adherents daily". (82) Over two decades, Jan Note and 
his followers had developed an army with close on 1,000 members, a sophisticated 
system of comnnurication, rigid discipline, subtle defences and well defined criminal 
objectives. From a motley group of peasant marginals, who sought refuge from the 
police in the Klipriviersberg, a lumpen-worker alliance had emerged that held criminal 
control in the very heartland of industrialized white South Africa. Months before 
politically conscious blacks met to form the African National Congress, a black amay 
on the Witwatersrand - with branches as far away as Bloemfontein and Kimberley - was 
already delivering a serious practical challenge to a repressi~e~privileged white 
state. By lgl2, the police were under no illusions as to the magnitude of that 
challenge. 
The seriousness and severity of the challenge was first felt on the East 
Rand, and particularly in the vicinity of Boksburg and Benoni. In this area the 
Ninevite nerve centre was located within IfB1ue Sky Gaol", and it was from here that 
most of the criminal activities were orchestrated. Cinderella Prison, however, was 
more than simply an operations centre - it also constantly disgorged prisoners who had 
completed their sentences, the Ninevite troops. Once released, these Ninevites, 
including some of the most hardened and professional criminals on the Witwatersrand, 
were confined to the areas adjacent to Cinderella Prison by the operation of the pass 
laws. By an ironical and unintended twist, the pass laws guaranteed that the Boksburg 
and Benoni districts had an abnomally hi& percentage of black criminals. Further, 
these Ninevites made use of the same pass law in order to gain employment in one of 
the many mine compounds in the district. As a frustrated Minister of Native Affairs 
noted in 1913: If.. it will be recognised that our powers are limited by the 
provision of section 40 of the Pass Regulations." "That section", he mote, "requireu 
that the released criminal be given the opportunity of re-engaging himself." (83) The 
net result of all of this was that the district experienced what the Public Prosecutor 
termed "frequent waves of crime", especially house-breaking, robbery and some murders. (84) 
On 20th June 1912, the officer commanding the Benoni police wrote to his 
superior officers informing them that the Ninevite question had become "most serious 
and urgent". (85) A mere two days later the District Commandant for the East Fhnd, 
Inspector M. A. Hartigan, in turn brought the matter to the attention of the Secretary 
of the ICransvaal Police when he pointed out that Nongoloza's arny had "now attained a 
numerical strength and organisation sufficient to warrant its receiving prompt and 
eneretic attention". (86) From there the matter was successively referred to the 
Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General, and by the end of the year the 
Ninevite amy was under ministerial scrutiny. Government was examining "governmentu. 
But the fact that the South African state was taking a serious look at J m  Note's army 
was not simply as a result of the Ninevite attack on property - serious as that was. 
What had really galvanized the state into action was the fear that its law enforcement 
capacity in the compounds and cities was being seriously undermined by Nongolozats anqy. 
In particular, it had mde the unpleasant discovery that it could no longer rely on 
some of its most important collaborators in running a labour repressive economly - the 
"nonmais", or black police, and the industrial or compound "policetf. 
On the mines themselves, much of the day-to-day functioning of the 
oppressive system was ensured throub the activities of the specially selected and 
uniformed black compound "p~licemen~~. As management lackeys with state support, they 
were responsible for the discipline of the African labour force and for supplying the 
authorities with a constant stream of politico-economic intelligence. (87) Outside 
the compound gates the pass laws were enforced by their equally unpleasant black 
collaborators - the nongaais. In his contemporary account, Life Amongst the Coloured 
Miners of Johannesburg, F. S. Z. Peregrine had this to say of the non-i: 
For a picture of the average Zulu policeman at 
Johannesburg I would depict this: a creature, 
giant-like and large as to proportions, ferocious 
and forbidding of aspect, most callously brutal of 
action, and irredeemably ignorant. (88) 
There could have been no love lost between these black collaborators and most African 
miners - and the Ninevites singled them out for singularly unmerciful attention. In 
this latter sense, and in a largely unconscious or unintended fashion, Nongoloza's 
army helped paralyse some of the black working class' most immediate oppressors. 
The state was both concerned and unimpressed with this paralysis. The 
police were shocked to learn that on the York mine, Krugersdorp, "everybody in the 
compound belonged to this society the ~inevites] , including the police boys". (89) 
In late August of 1912, the Deputy Commissioner of Police was expressing concern about 
the possibility of the nongads being infiltrated or totally demoralized by the 
Ninevites, and, by January 1913, he informed Pretoria that: "I do not consider that 
the native police is at present capable of dealing effectively with native 
criminals." (90) At the height of their ascent the Ninevites not only ran a successful 
criminal organization; they challenged the black collaborating arm of the state and 
achieved, at very least, a stalemate situation. An increasingly powerful South African 
state had no taste for stalemate situations. 
b I 
The Decline of the Ninevites,1912-1920 
On 161th December 1910, "Chief George Schoko , Jim Ntlokonkulu (l1 the giant 
of the crooked eyes") and two other trusted lieutenants set out for "workf1 on the Main 
Reef Road in time-honoured Ninevite fashion. At about noon they intercepted three 
black miners making their way to Maraisburg, and immediately went into the abathelisa 
routine. Posing as detectives, the Ninevites first asked to see the workers' passes 
and then demanded their purses. When the miners refused to hand over their money, 
Schoko and his men attacked them with sticks and eventually over-powered them. They 
then relieved two of the workers of £28 in gold, and administered a further thrashing 
to the third, who was unwise eno- to be penniless. Thereafter, the Ninevites 
returned to their llfortff in the prospect holes near Canada Junction. 
The victims, on the other hand, made their way to the Langlaagte Police 
Station, where they reported the robbery to Detective Duffey and Police Constable King. 
Duffey and two of the miners set out in the direction of Maraisburg in pursuit of the 
attackers, whilst King, in the company of the third worker, set out to search the 
Canada Junction area. King had the misfortune to find whom he was looking for. No 
sooner had he succeeded in ordering the Ninevites out of the hole in which they were 
hiding than he was attacked and fatally stabbed in the head. The terrified worker 
accompanying him fled back to Langlaagte, where he reported the murder. After a night- 
long search police eventually discovered the body of King, thrust into an ant-bear 
hole, on the morning of 17th December. (91) 
This Ninevite attack on a white state official aroused considerable 
indignation, and a black journalist was probably only slightly overstating the case 
when he later wrote that "Public and police alike felt that Ninevism, that cynical 
challenge to authority, [had to] be wiped out". (92) Members of the public, the Fire 
Brigade, Prisons Department officials, the Police Band, and over 300 policemen were 
all in attendance at Kingfs funeral. (93) Determined to find the killers of the 
constable, Fkjor Nanogordato (CID) assigned one of his most able officers to the case 
on a full-time basis - Detective A. J. Hoffman. 
Despite thorough and protracted searches of the more usual Ninevite haunts 
to the south-west of Johannesburg, Hoffman enjoyed no immediate success in his hunt 
for Schoko and Ntlokonkulu. This was hardly surprising since both Ninevites, "feeling 
the heat" near Johannesburg, had decided to migrate to more moderate climes in search 
of "work". Schoko, in fact, had headed for Kimberley, the only large city outside the 
Witwatersrand which offered the Ninevite "chief the type of prison/compound complex 
with which he was so familiar. Ntlokonkulu had opted for the country life, and 
eventually made his way to the far south-east of the Reef, where he placed himself 
under "chief" Jacob Xaba. 
Almost a month after King' S murder, Hofflnant S arrests of "vagrants" and 
scouring of crMnal haunts started to pay off. The detective received information to 
the effect that the wanted Ninevites were in the vicinity of Vlakfontein. On the night 
of 18th January 1911, he and Detective Probationer H. G. Boy tracked a group of suspects 
towards Hartleyfs farm. The first thing that they found was "a dying heifer from which 
the hindquarters had been cut" - a sign of Jacob Xabals catering arrangements for a 
Ninevite get-together. (94) Following the trail, they came to a hut, the Indian 
inhabitants of which "were bewailing the loss of their money, poultry and clothesV.(95) 
Eventually, at about 2.00 a.m. on the morning of the lgth, the detectives and their 
black assistants came across Xaba, Ntlokonkulu and the main Ninevite party. On the 
approach of the police the Ninevites, who were preparing a sheep for roasting, at once 
fled. Hoff'man, however, gave personal chase and, with the assistance of a noqpai, 
succeeded in arresting Xaba. Boy tracked the remainder of the fleeing Ninevites, and 
towards daybreak arrested "The Giant with the Crooked Eyes" - Ntlokonkulu - near a mine 
pumping station. (96) 
The capture of Xaba was in itself an achievement. Indeed, both Hoffman and 
Boy received commendations and rewards for their part in these events. But, within 
hours of Ntlokonkululs arrest, the detectives achieved further success when the "Giant 
with the Crooked Eyesff informed the police that Schoko had been involved in a fight in 
Kimberley, and that he was lyirig in hospital there, recovering from stab wounds in the 
stomach. (97) Telegraphic copunication with the Kimberley police ensured the rapid 
arrest of "Kleintjeff - ~eorge' Schoko. Within 40 days of the King murder three of the 
most notable Ninevite leaders had been taken into custody and Nongolozals army was on 
the def ensive . 
In March 1911, Jacob Xaba appeared in the Johannesburg Supreme Court and was 
sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment with hard labour for stock theft. 
Not long thereafter, Schoko and Ntlokonkulu were sentenced to death for the murder of 
the white constable, and executed in Pretoria. A further setback for Nongolozals army 
occurred in August 1911. David Wda and Jim Nomkehla, the most prominent remaining 
members of Xabals unit, were arrested and prosecuted for housebreaking, attempted m d e r  
and murder in the Heidelberg District. Worse still was to follow. In a specific 
attempt to deal with professional criminals, the government legislated for the 
"indeterminate sentence". (98) When Sm Nyambezi appeared in court in February 1912 on 
seven counts of robbery and public violence, he was promptly awarded the indeterminate 
sentence? whilst 15,members of his gang received lengthy prison sentences. 
By early 1912, then, the state had already started to make inroads into the 
Ninevite organization - and particularly into its leadership. But the success that 
it had achieved was also largely piecemeal and unintentional in the sense that up to 
about mid-1912 the police were not fully aware of the depth, breadth, or extent of 
the Ninevite army. Certainly they saw llgangs" under the control of Schoko, Xaba and 
Nyambezi, but they were not fully cognisant of the linkages between them, or of the 
overriding loyalty to Nongoloza. For the real shock that came with fuller knowledge, 
the police had to await the nastier events of May and June 1912. 
On, the night of May 12, 'vGovernorll Jim Swazi, "General"Bil1 Langalene, and 
"Colonelll Bill Frisby set out from the Cason Mine compound for a criminal sortie into 
the Boksburg district. The members of this particular Ninevite squad had joined 
Nongoloza1s army while in jail - probably Cinderella Prison - and co-operated closely 
thereafter. By the end of the evening, for motives that are not entirely clear, they 
had murdered a black policeman named Tsobana, using a gun acquired from one 
"Apricotv. (99) A mere two evening8 later, on the 14th May, "General" Charlie 
Mxotshwa of the New Kleinfontein compound - a man who, it was said, could call on as 
many as a hundred "soldiers" spread as far afield as Nigel - masched a squad of 
Ninevites into the Brakpan district in search of robbery victims. On open ground 
near the railway station the Ninevites approached a white miner named Owen Duffy, who 
was making his way with his goods from Benoni to the single quarters of the Brakpan 
mine. Duffy asked "General" Nxotshwa and three of his"so1diers" to help him to 
carry his mattress. Minutes later he was clubbed to death, but on ransacking his 
goods the Ninevites could only uncover a key and a knife. (100) 
These two brutal killings, within days of each other, shocked the East Rand 
and jolted the police into action. It was while undertaking enquiries into these 
murders that Detectives W. Futter and H. G. Boy first came to appreciate the full 
magnitude of Nongolozafs army. The publicity attendant upon these trials produced 
further public concern and, by mid-June, the Ninevites were receiving parlianentary 
attention. (101) It was in the immediate wake of these events that the state started 
to counter-attack Nongoloza's &my in earnest. 
The government looked, in the first instance, to the police to achieve the 
destruction of Jan Note's $rmy\ Some of the groundwork had already been done, albeit 
unwittingly, since Ninevite notables such as Xaba, Schoko and Nyanbezi had already 
been accounted for. The police consolidated on this start by building up a reasonably 
sophisticated picture of the organization and its modus operandi. They also took the 
more practical step of infiltrating informers into the compounds of several East Rand 
mines, a precaution that reaped benefits on at least one subsequent occasion. (102) 
But, as the most senior police officers were not slow to point out to the Department 
of Justdce and others, the problem of the Ninevite a m y  did not simply end there. 
What point was there in the police rounding up Nongolozals followers in the morning 
when, in the afternoon, Cinderella Prison disgorged another squad of co~rrmitted 
followe~s whom the pass laws confined to the area? What was the purpose of prosecuting 
and pdshing members of an organization when the very act of imprisonment browt them 
into more immediate and disciplined contact with the Ninevite leadership? Clearly what 
was required was action, not only on the Witwatersrand but within the prison system 
itself. 
In September 1912, the Minister of Justice instructed the Director of Prisons 
to convene a confefence of Prison Superintendents in Pretoria. The purpose of the 
meeting was to formulate recommendations to the Minister for dealing with the Ninevites 
in prison. The resolutions arising from the Pretoria gathering suggested a more or 
less predictable blend of "stick and carrot" measures - plenty of stick and very little 
carrot. Amongst the reforms suggested was that the "best classes11 of black prisoners 
be allowed to associate more freely where exercise yards were available, and "that 
single cells for separation at nights be provided as far as possible". The flow of 
Ninevite intelligence was to be disrupted through removing well known leaders to 
Robben Island, and replacing black warders with Europeans. Further, members of 
prison gangs should be punished for this l'offencelt and Prison Boards should be asked 
"not to recommend remission of sentence to known members of these gcmgsl'. (103) 
This countesattack by the state on his army did not escape the notice of 
Nongoloza himself. Note was n a h l l y  concerned when, during 1911-12, he found that 
a growing number of his most able "genera.l.~~~ were being confined to prison. But what 
seems to have concerned the Mkosi Nkulu most of all was the new indeterminate 
sentence that had been passed on Sam Ny-ambezi. Nongoloza, under a comuruted life 
sentence, was due to appear before the Prisons Board in July 1912 and he stood to 
forfeit the chance of a remission of sentence if unabated Ninevite activity 
persisted. (104) At some point after February, therefore, Note sent out a message 
f r ~ m  prison that he "wanted things kept quiet for a while as he was endeavouring to 
get his sentence reduced". (105) Thus Detective Hoffman mi&t have had only part of 
the story when he noted in August that: "Most of the leaders are at present in gaol, 
a d  consequently we have a lull in serious crime." (106) 
As it transpired, the Prisons Board that met on 8 July 1912 decided not to 
make any recommendation in Jan Note's case but simply chose to reconsider the matter 
in a year's time. It would appear that this constituted a serious blow to the hopes 
and plans of Nongoloza, who by now had been in Pretoria local jail for at least four 
years. Shortly thereafter Nongoloza was "befriendedf1 by his new mopean gaoler, 
Warder Paskin, and now the authorities saw their chance for the most powerful attack 
of all on the Ninevites. The Priaons Department and the police dangled the opportunity 
of future sentence remission and state employment before the eyes of the King of 
Nineveh. On 27th December 1912 Nongoloza made a statement to the Director of Prisons 
throw his friend Warder Paskin: 
... the new law and the new prison administration 
have made me change my heart ... I am quite prepared 
to go to Cinderella Prison or any other prison where 
Ninevites say they get orders and to tell them that 
I give no orders even if it costs me my life. I 
would tell them that I am no longer king and have 
nothing to do with Nineveh . . . (107) 
At some time after mid-1913 Nongoloza, a man who at one stage could muster a thousand 
lumpenproletarian troops on the Witwatersrand, a leader who ha,d the unquestioned 
support of generals, captains and lieutenants spread throu&out hundreds of square 
miles in South Africa's industrial heartland, became a "native warderff in the South 
African Police. (108) 
Neither Nongolozafs defection nor the other measures taken by the state 
were sufficient to ensure the rapid or total disintegration of the Ninevite army. 
While the basic nexus of pass law, compound and prison remained intact at the heart 
of a repressive political economy, there was always a sociological host culture 
capable of sustaining such movements. (109) What the state' S various measures did 
achieve, however, was the crippling of the Ninevite movement in its most developed 
form, and its fragmentation. By late 1914 the Minister of Justice, N. J. de Wet, was 
confident that the state clearly held the upper hand. (110) 
The upper hand was never allowed really to relax during the following 20 
years. The effect of the war and its aftermath on the Ninevite movement has yet to 
be studied in detail, but it is clear that the remnants of Nongoloza's asmy continued 
to fight its own struggle in the compounds and prisons while the Empire's troops were 
engaged on other fronts. The Ninevites who murdered Matshayeli Zungu in 1915, for 
example, were drawn from the qompounds of four mines - the Angelo, Comet, Cason and 
Driefontein. But it was perhaps in the immediate wake of the Great War that the 
greatest resurgence of the Ninevite movement took place - and for many of the same 
structural reasons that facilitated its development after the South African War. As 
is usual in post-war periods, the value of real wages dmpped markedly, and in South 
Africa this hardship was felt particularly acutely by the black population. Under 
these circumstances it is not surprising to find further "marginalization" and an 
*increase in crime. And, as in the post-Boer War period, it is likely that the state's 
apparatus for controlling the pass laws operated more efficiently once the war no 
longer diverted most ot its energy. The net effect of much of this would be to make 
more Africans "criminals" and to swell the prison population. In 1919, the Ninevites 
t 
were certainly active, both in and outside of the Kimberley prisons. (111) They were 
also reported as being present, albeit in embryonic form, at the Noordhoek prison. 
That they were still capable of making ambitious plans for state officials is also 
evident,from the report of at least one Prison Superintendent. The officer in charge 
of the &ban Point Prison reported in 1919: 
At the early part of this year a Ninevite affair was 
discovered, wherein it was planned to throw the 
European warders overboard from the ferry boat whilst 
crossing the baq. This was happily nipped in the bud 
and the ringleaders punished with salutary effect. (112) 
The years thereafter, however, saw a gradual decline in organized Ninevite 
activity. At present there is no evidence to show it being present in its original 
form in the'mine compounds after 1919 and, to an increasing extent, the movement 
became confined to the prisons proper. In 1927 it was reported as being present in 
the Barberton Prison, and, as late as 1935, Jan Note's Ninevite model - by now nearly 
half a century old - could still inspire black combination in the Durban Point 
Prison. (113) Perhaps the convicts, as Nongoloza himself once did, continued to draw 
inspiration from the book of Nahum: 
Thou also shalt seek a refuge 
Because of the enemy. 
Conclusions 
In his study of tlsocial banditry", Eric Hobsbawm notes that it is ttusually 
prevalent at two moments of historical evolution: that at which primitive and 
connuunally organised society gives way to class-ad-state society, and that at which 
the traditional rural peasant society gives wa$ to the modern economyn. (114) But, 
he notes, "the only large regions in which it cannot be easily traced are Sub-Saharan 
Africa and India". (115) It is within the context of these two broad observations 
that the social historian of South Africa is first tempted to insert the Ninevites. 
It is not a wholly unpromising start. At least as much as any other period 
in South African history, the years between the mid-1880s and 1920 fit Hobsbawm's 
description. (116) The fall of independent African states, the rise and decline of a 
black peasantry, imperial intervention and capitalist expansion, the formation of 
Union and the Native Land Act of 1913 are only some of the historical high-water marks 
which lap against the processes which Hobsbawm outlines. But the similarity between 
the Ninevites and his "social bandits" does not lie simply at this generalized 
structural level, it goes deeper. 
The groups that Hobsbawm describes are essentially rmal people with ties 
of kinship and custom. Nuch of this, too, is to be found in the Zulu-dominated 
Ninevites. The tlchieftf at the head of the gang, but more especially the presence of 
fhcr kehla, point stm31p:1y towdh-3 ZU3.a ctustorn m d  traditiuml eooiefy. The J . ~ d a & q  
of the "urban" %lnev,vltes was strongly flavowed with rural metaphor and they opoke 
constantly of "buck", ttbirds", tqfnms" a3ld "men who came with horsesft. And, to the 
extent that they did have a progranrme at all, the Ninevite leadership did not exclude 
rural objectives. Note himself spoke of his love and longin$ for cattle and the 
country, and one follower, Umfanawenduka, told the police how the leaders constantly 
tried to "entice natives to go awqy into the hills and live with themQ1 and to "desert 
from the work on various mines on the ReeftQ. (117) Seen from this perspective, the 
Ninevites were landless labourers seeking to return to a peasant life that was being 
rapidly destroyed: urban bands with a f o m  of rural consciousness resisting 
proletasiaaization. (118) 
The age and social groups recruited into the "social banditst' a d  Ninevites, 
respectively, also bear comparison. In the case of the Ninevites, these similarities 
are perhaps brought into sharper relief if we keep in mind a shattered Zulu military 
system, Mzoozepi@s early experiences ant3 the extension of European commercial 
agriculture into Natal during the late 19th century. Hobsbawm writes of the social 
bmdits : 
Aein, certain age-graupa - most obviously the young 
men between puberty and m r i a m  - m e  both more 
mobile and less shackled by the responsibilities of 
land, wife and children which make the life of the 
outlaw almost impossible for adult peasants. It is 
indeed well established that social bandits are 
normally young and unmarried. Men msginal to the 
rural economy, or not yet absorbed or re-absorbed 
into it, will be drawn into banditry, notably ex- 
soldiers, who, with herdsmen, form probably its 
largest single occupatioml component. So will 
certain occupations which maintain a man outside the 
fmework of constant social control in the community, 
or the supervision of the ruling group - e.g. herdsmen 
and drovers. (119) 
Although we do not have a detailed socio-economic backgmund of the Ninevites as yet, 
there is something of a familiar ring in these words. 
But it is also at this point that the similarities end. This becomes quite 
clear as soon as Hobsbawm outlines what he considers to be the central characteristic 
of the groups which he has examined: 
The point about social bandits is that they are 
outlaws wham the lord asld state regard 
as criminals, but who remain within peasant 
society, and are considered by their people as 
heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for 
justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and 
in anfr case as men to be admired, helped and 
supported. (120) 
The Ninevites were no b.md of peasant outlaws eliciting the adminiition, help or 
support of their people. 
In the industrial revolution that engulfed southern Africa after the 
discovery of diamonds ayld gold, there was a particularly rapid succession of social 
formations. In the midst of these traumatic changes there was no time for the 
landless to linger in the countryside, and those suffering most from the ravages of 
proletarianization were swept into the migrant labour system that carried them to 
the cities and conpounds. South Africa's "peasant outlaws" - still carrying some of 
the conceptual baggage of the countryside - came to town with the rest of their 
kinsfnen. There, living literally and figuratively on the margins of industrial 
society, they were transformed into essentially urban gangs. No wonder they were 
difficult to trace in this particular part of sub-Saharan Africa - they were living 
in the prospect holes, abandoned mine shafts, derelict buildings and caves 
aurroundirq the towns - far from their rural homelands. 
Hounded a d  harassed by the pass laws in the centre of the white cities, 
theee 1umpenprol.etarian groups strmok at the most vulnerable members of the 
industrializing system - the black migrant workers making their my home with wages. 
Qn the very geographical margin of the Witwatersrand they stole and plundered from 
their fellow Africans, or terrorized the inhabitants of the urban black  location^^^. 
As such they were feared, hated and resented by the majority of proletarians or 
migrant workers. Here there was no room for help, support or admiration. When the 
Ninevites come into close contact with urban institutions, they were of the most 
depressing, authoritarian and dehumanizing sort - the prisons and the mine compounds. 
These institutions provided the Ninevites with rich recruiting grounds since in South 
Africa miserable wages and endless pass law convictions ensured that today's 
proletarian was tomorrow~s prisoner. (121) As exclusively male institutions, the 
prisons and compounds also provided a host culture readily able to sustain 
intimibtion, violence, organization and perverted sexual expression, It was largely 
these institutions which ensured that this part of sub-Saharan Africa produced not 
social but profoundly anti-social bandits. 
But the role of the Ninevites should not be minimized simply because they 
were not "social banditstt and because much of their activity was directed against 
fellow Africans. Neither is their part in South African working class history so 
unimportant as to warrant only the single cursory line which Walker devotes to 
them. (122) Certainly the Ninevite leadership had a low level of political awareness, 
but it was at least sufficiently conscious as to perceive its followers as being in 
a state of rebellion in an unjust society. To the extent that its activities were 
not directed towards the black working class, the organization saw itself as 
redressing the balance between the exploiters and the exploited, the haves and the 
have nots, the powerful a d  the powerless, in a markedly inegalitarian society. (123) 
Under the leadership of one charismatic man and professional criminals, there 
developed a powerful and sophisticated organization which welded together lwnpen- 
proletarian elements and part of the working class. At the height of its development 
the Ninevite amy - albeit for essentially non-political objectives - succeeded in 
paralysing the black collaborating arm of the white ruled state. For at least these 
reasons, if for none other, we should reassess the resistance and revolutionary 
potential of the lumpenproletariat in South Africa's historical evolution. 
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white mineworkerst union came when mining capitalists sought to cheapen the 
cost of steamship travel from Europe to the Rand and, by so doing, increase the 
supply of cheap labour. See Standard and Diggers' News, 22 Aug. 1892. 
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